

000 try living on remembered glories, be imitated in Prague or Warsaw? Why should English plays, written for a completely different public, be played in these Eastern capitals? One must break that habit of imitation which was inevitable as long as French, English, or Belgian capital, investing in the mines, railroads, and factories of the "Eastern Marches," pushed its books, films, and styles upon them. Just as nationalized industry now stands on its own feet, so Eastern European cultures must learn to stand by their own strength.

626 Unhappily, in freeing themselves from the spell of the West, the literature, science, and art of these Marches became totally dependent on the new metropolis. Once imitation was spontaneous and voluntary, but now it is obligatory. Any attempt to find one's own way is denounced as Titoism. Any attempt to reach into one's own national past is possible only to the extent that that past parallels the development of the Russian nation. One may turn to folklore, obviously, and to the realistic plays of the nineteenth century. But, for example, Poland has a tradition of romantic drama which does not lend itself to realistic representation. It also possesses a tradition of stage production which is known as "monumental theater." To continue such traditions would smack of dangerous heresy. The fight against "cosmopolitanism" is in reality nothing more than the act of emptying a retort and refilling it with a different fluid. In the past, a particular substance was created in this retort through the interaction of native and imported elements. Today the imported element appears in much purer form, for a sufficient number of laboratory workers are eager to maintain the necessary respect for the formula.

- 186 In the last century, the "decadent West" was condemned by patriotic Russian historians because it was liberal, and
3 [The "Eastern Marches" - Analyst]

Looking to the West

47

because the ideas that emanated from it threatened auto- 186 ●
cratic governments. Nor was it only these defenders of
the throne who criticized it mercilessly. One has but to
read Tolstoi's *What Is Art?* to get a picture of the scorn
for Western sophistication that is so typical of the Rus-
sians. Tolstoi regarded Shakespeare's plays as collections of
bloody crimes, and French painting (this was the period
of the flowering of Impressionism) as the daubs of de-
generates. After the Revolution, when once again the
social system of Russia differed from that of the West, it
was not difficult to enlarge on this precedent with a goodly
number of arguments. Didn't Russia's strength lie in its
suspicion of the West; and weren't even the Tsarist his-
torians working for the Revolution by cultivating Rus-
sia's self-assurance and faith in the special calling of the
nation? Conscious of their hitherto latent power, the
"Scythians," as the great Russian poet Blok called his
nation, at last began to march. Therefore, it would seem
that the nations lying between the Baltic and Mediter-
ranean seas would do well to imitate this Russian self-
assurance and free themselves from the bad habit of parrot-
ing the West.

The intellectual understands, of course, that he him-
self is "cosmopolitan" since he looks to the West for *some-
thing*. This does not mean, however, that he complains
about the orders that have banished Parisian boulevard
art, or American detective stories from his country. A great
many cultural phenomena which excite the "elite" in
Western countries are distasteful to him. Asked whether
T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party* should be played in his
native land, he would undoubtedly answer "No"; whereas,
he finds *The Wasteland* by the same author an interest-
ing piece of poetry. The new acquisition that the people
of Central and Eastern Europe will never want to re-

- 186 linquish is the feeling of responsibility for what the public gets from editors or producers. If, for example, one considers a play bad, one should not present it even though it might be a considerable financial success. (Just imagine a Prague or Warsaw worker looking at *The Cocktail Party*!) On the other hand, the ban on Stravinsky's *Le Sacre du printemps* is obviously absurd. The "cosmopolitanism" of the intellectual I describe is very moderate. He makes distinctions between what is worthy of his respect in the West and what owes its success to cheap publicity appealing to the taste of a dubious "elite."

The superiority of Russian realist painting (*pięredwizniki*) over French Impressionism has been proved in Moscow. Unfortunately, the eye is used in the appreciation of a painting, and the most learned discourse cannot transform an ugly canvas into a great work of art—which is obviously to be deplored! At every step, be it in the realm of aesthetics or ethics, one encounters the opposition that the strangeness of man raises against the wisest of theories. It is reasonable that a responsibly raised child should inform on his father if he observes his behavior to be contrary to the good of the social order on whose well-being the happiness of all mankind depends. And yet the disgust such behavior awakens in many people is just as inexplicable as their preference for Manet over Russian nineteenth-century realists.

- 000 The recklessness with which the Russians are carrying out their mental operations in the people's democracies is reaching dangerous proportions. Consistent reasoning which orders one to by-pass a fact when a concept comes into conflict with reality must eventually lead to costly errors. Hitler's war on "degenerate art" sprang from the same seed as the new ethics of his party which ordered the slaughter of "inferior races"; and in these very ideas lay

Ketman

61

ever, to proceed somewhat in the manner of a naturalist determining major groups and families.

National Ketman is broadly diffused throughout the masses, and even the upper brackets of the Party in the various dependent states are not free of it. Because Tito, like Sadra, announced his heresy to all the world, millions of human beings in the people's democracies must employ exceedingly ingenious means of masking themselves. Instructive displays of condemnation of those who wished to follow the national road to socialism in individual Eastern capitals taught the public what kind of phrases and reflexes can expose one to reproach for harboring this fatal tendency. The surest safeguard is to manifest loudly one's awe at Russia's achievements in every field of endeavor, to carry Russian books under one's arm, to hum Russian songs, to applaud Russian actors and musicians enthusiastically, etc. A writer who has not consecrated a single work to outstanding Russian figures or to Russian life, but has confined himself to national themes, cannot consider himself entirely safe. The chief characteristic of the people who practice this Ketman is an unbounded contempt for Russia as a barbaric country. Among the workers and peasants it is most often purely emotional, and based on observation of either the soldiers of the liberating army, or (since during the war a great many were in areas directly administered by the Russians) of Russians in their daily life.

Because until now the living standard of the masses in Russia was so much lower than that of the so-called people's democracies, national Ketman finds abundant nourishment. It cannot be defined simply as nationalism. For many centuries hatred existed between the Central European Slavs and the Germans, still it was colored

¹ [For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60
-- Analyst --]

- 186 among the Slavs by a respect for Germany's material
626 achievements. On the other hand, perceiving by comparison the greater refinement of his own customs, his greater organizational ability (be it only in respect to transportation or the handling of machinery), the Central European would express his attitude toward Russia, if he could, by a disdainful shrug of his shoulders—which, however, doesn't prevent him from shuddering in fear before the countless hordes pouring out of the Euro-Asian continent.

But this Ketman is not exclusively emotional in its appeal. Amid the young intelligentsia of working-class origin the overwhelming opinion can be summed up shortly as "Socialism—yes, Russia—no"; and this is where the subtleties of doctrinal differences arise. The countries of Europe, this line of reasoning begins, are infinitely more prepared to realize socialism than Russia. Their population is more intelligent; most of their land is under cultivation; their systems of communication and their industry are more highly developed. Measures based on absolute cruelty are unnecessary and even pointless since there exists a greater degree of social discipline. Nevertheless, "the national road to socialism" has been condemned and many efforts made to prove that whoever is opposed to total adaptation to Russian models and to surrendering to Russian dictatorship is a traitor who must share the fate of Tito—that is, must come out against the Center² and thus weaken its war potential without which there can be no revolution on a world scale. To pronounce oneself against this thesis would be to deny the New Faith and to introduce in its place a different faith, for example one directly linked to Marx and Engels. Many do so. Others, seeing in the alliance between Tito and the West an example of historical fatality, and rejecting the idea that this fatality

Ketman

63

may be due simply to the Center's policy toward dependent nations, shut themselves up in a Ketman which does not hamper the Center in its external acts. A true Moslem, even though he be deeply attached to his Ketman, never seeks to injure Islam in those areas where it is fighting for its life against unbelievers. Such Ketman expresses itself only in practical moves which do no harm in the world struggle, but which on the other hand safeguard national interests whenever possible. 186 ● 626

The Ketman of Revolutionary Purity is a rare variety, more common in the large cities of Russia than in the people's democracies. It is based on a belief in the "sacred fire of the revolutionary epoch of Lenin" which burns in such a poet as Mayakovski. Mayakovski's suicide in 1930 marked the end of an era distinguished by the flowering of literature, the theater, and music. The "sacred fire" was dampened, collectivization was introduced mercilessly, millions of Soviet citizens perished in slave labor camps, a ruthless policy toward non-Russian nations was established. Literature became flat and colorless under the influence of imposed theories; Russian painting was destroyed; Russian theater, then the foremost in the world, was deprived of freedom to experiment; science was subjected to directives from Party chiefs. A man who reasons thus hates Him with all his heart, holding Him responsible for the terrible lot of the Russian people and for the hatred they inspire in other nations.

Still, he is not altogether sure whether He is necessary or not. Perhaps in extraordinary periods such as the present the appearance of a tyrant must be considered desirable. Mass purges in which so many good communists died, the lowering of the living standard of the citizens, the reduction of artists and scholars to the status of yes-men, the extermination of entire national groups—what

- 186 other man would dare undertake such measures? After
 626 all, Russia stood firm against Hitler; the Revolution
 weathered the attack of enemy armies. In this perspective,
 His acts seem effective and even justified, perhaps, by an
 exceptional historical situation. If He had not instituted
 an exceptional terror in the year 1937, wouldn't there have
 been more people willing to help Hitler than there actu-
 ally were? For example, doesn't the present-day line in
 scholarship and art, no matter how at odds it may be at
 times with common sense, effectually raise Russian morale
 in the face of the war that threatens? He is an infamous
 blot on the bright New Faith, but a blemish we must
 tolerate for the moment. And indeed we must even
 support Him. The "sacred fire" has not gone out. When
 victory is achieved, it will burst forth again with its old
 strength, the bonds He imposed will fall away, and rela-
 tions between nations will operate on new and better
 principles. This variety of Ketman was widespread if not
 universal in Russia during the Second World War, and its
 present form is a rebirth of an already once-deceived hope.

626 *Aesthetic Ketman*¹ is born of the disparity between man's
 517 longings and the sense-satisfactions the New Faith offers.
 A man of taste cannot approve the results of official pres-
 sure in the realm of culture no matter how much he ap-
 plauds the latest verses, how many flattering reviews he
 writes of current art expositions, nor how studiously he
 pretends that the gloomy new buildings coincide with his
 personal preferences in architecture. He changes com-
 pletely within the four walls of his home. There one finds
 (if he is a well-situated intellectual) reproductions of
 works of art officially condemned as bourgeois, records
 of modern music, and a rich collection of ancient authors
 in various languages. This luxury of splendid isolation is
 pardoned him so long as his creative work is effective prop-
 1[For a definition of "ketman", see Cat. 116, pp 57-60 -- Anal 1954]

795 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
● 186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

9

tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomy of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

RELIGION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

S.U.

797 tive in Russia at the request of the government, bringing food,
659 clothing, and medicine to many tens of thousands. Yet even
798 while this work of charity was in progress, priests and prelates
648 were sentenced to death and executed, churches were looted
and closed, and many of the faithful were exiled. The Bolshe-
viks insisted that, until the Vatican recognized the regime as
a lawfully constituted government, clergymen professing al-
legiance to Rome must be regarded as enemies; Russian émigré
circles were just as vehement in demanding that no such recog-
nition be accorded; and circles representative of the Orthodox
Church opposed even the Papal Relief Mission, on the ground
that its directors were in reality proselytizers. In the circum-
stances, the Vatican tried to carry on its relief work as long as
possible, and to use whatever influence it could muster to save
the persecuted bishops and priests. In the end, however, the
isolated remnants of Roman Catholicism in Russia lost even
E the remotest hope that Rome could do anything for them.

659 The countries west of Russia, most of them newly estab-
186 lished, presented less formidable obstacles to the mission of
795 the Church; but in not a few of them conditions were turbulent
enough. In Czechoslovakia, for example, insurgent nationalism
combined with anticlericalism to create within the Catholic
clergy a sizable group who not only wished to rid the Church
of every vestige of association with the Habsburgs but also
strove to "reform" the ecclesiastical organization itself and to
do away with such constraints as celibacy. However, the seces-
sion and subsequent excommunication of this group led to a
great strengthening of the loyal majority. Catholics were col-
lectively more resolute, and by 1925 the fever had abated, and
relations between Church and State were established on a solid
foundation. Elsewhere the story was similar, though perhaps
less stormy and tawdry.

000 In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by

563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this com-
munal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats,
Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or
Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for
a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under
the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active
part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović
himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat
capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated
propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was
reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin,
Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old
centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented
the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official.
Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and
so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans
and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted
the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced
Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution
proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the
liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all
communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem
pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Com-
munist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different
peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović
(better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of
the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December,
1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian
and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of
Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the
fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Mon-
tenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia. 668 186 563

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.)—the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were: 668 185

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecký, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedlý, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will purify Prague and the border districts, and we are in the position to do so because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people. We belong to the great

¹ [See category 116, p. 193 -- Analyst]

186 Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands
661 with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he
563 goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians.
What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do?
And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere.
We are greater than all of them; with our culture we can stand up
to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless
situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many
composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana?
How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Ales? How many
historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the
greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . .
Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all
carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant
our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*,
June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie
in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that
it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Com-
munists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's
Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly,
March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success,
though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had
in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncom-
promisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today.
However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and
as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call
pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert
that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country
is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova
Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*,
London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had
certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that no-
where, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were
Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance,
the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed
by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The
Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was
headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible). ¹⁸⁶ ⁶⁶¹ ⁵⁶³

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school. ⁴⁶⁶ ⁶¹¹ ⁵⁶³

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne*. It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German. ⁵⁶³ ⁶⁶¹

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

CHAPTER VII

'TITOISTS' BEFORE TITO



TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its 661
bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureau- 136 ●
cracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the 687
Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where
the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's
new vassal states, but also on the national question in the
U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known
aspect of Russian policy.

The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are
the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly
been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian
Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested
for 'national deviations'. In 1933, Skrypnyk, the most prominent
leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its
Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide
in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the
Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the
Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar
of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as
nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent
to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and
the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers.
At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in
1933, he said: 'In Ukraine our leading Party members and
Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy
has been to a good school in this country and has learned how
to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the
remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organiza-
tions. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction
for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary
organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they
have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of
our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

661 when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared
186 to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan'
687 (Nos. 15-21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest. He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadzhikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist, in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

<i>Presidents</i>	<i>Republic</i>
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkhimbayev	Tadzhikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadzhikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolgat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
<i>Prime-Ministers</i>	<i>Republic</i>
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadzhikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

- 186 for instance, was more successful in finding quislings in France
668 than in Russia, but much less successful in Poland, where he could not get one general or military unit to fight on his side. Nevertheless, Vlassov's defaulting was disquieting to the Russian authorities, and they took care never to mention it in the press or over the radio.

At the end of the war, repeated attacks in the press on fascist influence in the areas of occupation—Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea and the Caucasus—serve as clear testimony to the apathy or even enmity of the populations to the Russian authorities. For instance, *Bolshevik* of 17th August, 1944, stated: '... the population of White Russia was for three years deprived of real Soviet information, and was under the influence of lying fascist propaganda. This applied also to other now freed areas. The Soviet people remained true to their Fatherland. (Examples follow—Y.G.) ... This does not give us the right to quiescence. The treacherous enemy, with his lying propaganda, with his bloody terror, hitherto unparalleled in history, demoralised more than a few people, brought more than a little confusion in their consciousness. He strengthens his agency which conducts skilled undermining work ...' In another issue of *Bolshevik* there occurs this statement: 'The existence and the vitality of vestiges of capitalism in the mind of people in our country is explained not only by the fact that people's minds are lagging behind economic conditions, but also by the influence of an alien ideology ... The German fascist occupants endeavoured to implant the ideology of private property and of nationalism ... (The enemy) did his utmost to demoralise them, to poison their consciousness and to sap their belief in the rightness of our great cause.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 16th March, 1946).

The explanation is not convincing. The Nazi reign of terror would not sow doubts and breed hatred against the Russian regime, but on the contrary, would put it in a much better light in the eyes of the oppressed. This quotation reveals that, in spite of the German terror and oppression, anti-Russian 'nationalist deviations' occurred. To one who knows how to read the Communist Party press, such an admission, repeated in numerous articles, is a sure sign that an important fact is being touched on.

4 CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

000 It was nevertheless not entirely by chance that President Wilson took the initiative during the First World War in proclaiming that a just settlement in Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to world peace. Not only were Americans in many walks of life becoming aware of the importance of this region, but Wilson himself had at one time given some attention to its problems. As early as 1877, as an undergraduate at the College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University), Wilson wrote a paper on "Prince Bismarck," which reflected his interest in the role of Eastern Europe in the international relations of that period; but this was only a student's essay, and it touched on Eastern Europe no more than peripherally. It was as an international statesman that Wilson came forward in 1918 to proclaim in his Fourteen Points three principles, among others, that he considered fundamental to a peaceful settlement. These principles were: national self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe (Points X-XIII), free and equal trade (Point III), and a general association of nations (Point XIV).

This image of a just settlement was only partially achieved in the peace treaties for, although the new frontiers followed reasonably closely the national principles, the equally vital requirements of free trade and collective security were in large measure neglected. What is significant about Wilson's program is not the ultimate failure of the peace settlement, since his own program was implemented only in part, but the fact that he correctly stressed the three central issues affecting the destiny of Eastern Europe. Throughout modern history, the peoples of this region have struggled with the problems of national liberation, modernization, and regional organization, and in reviewing their history these three categories provide a useful framework of analysis.

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563 Of these three problems, that of national liberation is certainly the one that has concerned the peoples of this area

EASTERN EUROPE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5

most continuously. As minority groups, the peoples of Eastern Europe tended to suffer from discrimination at the hands of the governments whose territory they inhabited and, once they were infected with the spirit of the enlightenment, national liberation came to be regarded as the solution to all their problems. Significant reforms were indeed carried out in the nineteenth century within the existing political framework, but the road to reform was obstructed by many obstacles. Although national liberation almost inevitably means revolution and war, it appeared to many Eastern European leaders to be preferable to the available alternatives. The diplomatic history of Europe was, in fact, punctuated by great crises as one province after another broke loose from the Ottoman empire, and when this process culminated in the First World War and the liberation of the remaining peoples of this region, it was widely regarded as a logical step in human progress.

The leaders of Eastern European opinion did not regard national liberation as an end in itself, but rather as the best means for promoting the modernization of their peoples. This aim was stated in many different ways, some speaking of education, others of freedom, and many more of economic welfare. This is certainly a much broader objective than the principle of free and equal trade enunciated by Wilson, but that principle was an essential prerequisite to modernization in the view of the American president. In general terms it would not be unfair to say that the goal of Eastern European leaders in the last two centuries has been to raise the spiritual and material level of their peoples to the European standard established by England, France, Germany, and their smaller neighbors. This interpretation of their goal is certainly very generalized, yet it represents more accurately the aspirations of this region than do the specific programs of individual leaders or schools of thought. The fact that this objective has not yet been attained is fundamen-

6 CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

[648] The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

● 186
175 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

EASTERN EUROPE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7

ivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186 •
energy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
ern Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
larger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this
region were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism de-
veloped by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the
French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels
and by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars
were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and
until the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took
precedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a
Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the
political framework established in 1815, and their policies
produced significant results. It was only after the defeat of
liberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that national-
ism came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly
hardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end
of the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance
of their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming
among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-
Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe
achieved independence only to a limited degree before the
First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under
firm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these
nationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the
table on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563
were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government
dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the
third in area and fourth in population among the European
powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and ter-
ritorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace set-
tlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

incorporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařík, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramář to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařík, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
●/186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.

563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria [64] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

EASTERN EUROPE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11

Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies. ¹⁷⁵
¹⁸⁶ ●
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The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croats, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

12 CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

175 came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

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563 In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War. 175
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The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their co-nationals gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

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175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
●186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy.
When the Albanian liberation movement got under way,
it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally
in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in
Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern
Europe in the century before the First World War gives
particular attention to those peoples that achieved their
independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time,
important issues of political and religious rights that were
associated with the national movements but did not play an
equally important role in the political outcome of the First
World War have not been discussed. The Germans also
had significant national minorities in this region, but their
national movement took a different direction. The same
may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an im-
portant role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars,
and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Po-
land, was frequently worse than that of other minorities,
and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism.
It is important to recognize that there were many influen-
tial groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another
preferred increased autonomy within the existing political
framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of
this region made important social and economic progress
in the century before the First World War, and when in-
dependence was won it soon became apparent that some of
the nations with the highest level of attainment were those
that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement
in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but
it must be allowed that the principle of national self-
determination was applied with considerable consistency.

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

•186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

with the reconciliation of national differences through federal arrangements and with the broader cultural relationships of peoples with a common linguistic heritage. The most readily identifiable of these proposals are those associated with the Panslav movement, the plans for the reorganization of the Habsburg empire, and the federation schemes of the independent Danubian states. None of these projects embraced the entire region of Eastern Europe as it is understood today, but all were inspired by ideas relevant to the problems faced by this region in the twentieth century. 186 ● 631

The many-sided Panslav movement in its modern form can be traced to the new interest in Slavic history and languages shown by German scholars at the end of the eighteenth century. A realization of their cultural heritage was soon aroused among Slavic intellectual leaders, and it exerted a powerful stimulus to nationalism among the Poles, Czechs, and Croatians. Certain Polish thinkers in the first hopeful years after the settlement of 1815 favored Polish-Russian cooperation as a basis for Slavic unity, but in a few decades the Poles were seeking the aid of their fellow Slavs in the West against Russian oppression. The map and statistics of Slavic peoples published by the Slovak scholar, Šafařík, in 1842 were widely greeted as a revelation of Slavic strength, and in the revolutionary year of 1848 a congress was held in Prague to rally the peoples of the Slavic world. This rather haphazard gathering revealed the political weakness of Panslavism, but it produced some noble statements of individual and national rights and strengthened the self-confidence of the Slavic peoples as to their contribution to European civilization. In publicizing the views of the non-Russian Slavic leaders at the height of their liberal phase, the congress thus served a purpose. Although Slavic nationalism took precedence over liberalism in the latter half of the century, the ideas expounded at Prague in 1848 were never entirely forgotten. 186 648

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● 186 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848
668 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a
648 weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement
evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of
Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in
Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-
Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in
connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this
meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tend-
encies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish
war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an out-
burst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bring-
ing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power
politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence
in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and
was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This
trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress
held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitu-
tional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on
non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real conces-
sions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never
gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the
West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War
it would certainly have demanded that large parts of East-
ern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite rela-
tionship, and a liberal Russian government might also
have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influ-
ence.

631 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the
642 most challenging problem to the federalists, and the pro-
posals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and
ingenious. Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of
1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted
by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire
the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus
strengthen its international position. None of these proposals
had a serious chance of success, however, and when the em-
pire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national
units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
● 186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were de-
signed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the
grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of
these being a proposal for a federation stretching from
Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the
vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several
agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian,
Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national
leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts
were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict.
In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan
states proved to be the principal obstacle to their coopera-
tion, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated
Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied
war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this
period lay with the great powers, and the federation and
alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in
general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The
principal reality in international relations was the search
for security on the part of these two powers that drove them
to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guaran-
tee against political humiliation and military defeat. How-
ever, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this
game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage
for a new order.

Contrary to many Germans, Eastern European liberals remained true to political democracy but, in the field of economic policy, they were in accord with German views, giving preference to state interference and support rather than to free competition and individual initiative. 829
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Differences in the economic development of Western Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and of Germany and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, influenced the thinking of socialists in these countries and account for the differences in their outlook and their method of political action. While Western socialists sought to realize their aims by their own concerted self-help action (in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia particularly through trade unionism and political influence exercised in parliaments, in Latin countries either through revolution or political infiltration of public institutions), German and Eastern European socialists tended more and more towards economic and political statism. Moreover, the agrarians of Eastern Europe, like the liberals, socialists, and Christian (Catholic) Democrats, also asked for state action to further their economic and social aims. This tendency to look towards the state for aid in economic matters explains why many liberals, particularly in Czechoslovakia, favored vast social reforms benefiting the working class. It is also worth mentioning that the representatives of the liberal-minded bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia were always in favor of the highly progressive social legislation enacted in that country.

The tendency to ask the state for support in economic matters was a characteristic of the nationalism of Eastern European liberals. On the whole, however, the nationalism of liberals and of many others in this region was no more intense than the nationalism of similar groups in any of the Western countries, and among the liberals themselves there were great differences in interpreting liberalism. 186●

In Eastern Europe, liberalism was more closely connected

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186 with nationalism than it was in the West. This can be attributed chiefly to the fact that beginning with the nineteenth century national liberation found most of its protagonists and representatives among the liberal-minded intellectuals and statesmen. Consequently, almost all the liberals of this region appear as "national liberals." The fusing of liberalism and nationalism continued even after the First World War, chiefly because the Eastern European nations felt that they were endangered by the imperialistic designs of Germany, Italy, and Russia. The nations of this region, faced with such a danger, sought the protection of one or another of the European powers.

The historical development of these nations from the nineteenth century on, their geographic location, their special interests and dissimilar historical traditions—all these factors were instrumental in the growth of nationalism, an intense power which greatly influenced all the contemporary political trends (liberal, socialistic, agrarian, Catholic, etc.). Although nationalism impeded efforts for closer cooperation between the Eastern European nations, it proved to be a powerful force against both Nazi and Soviet imperialism.

It would be a mistake to assume that all Eastern European nationalism was chauvinistic. In this region, as elsewhere, there were two schools of nationalism: one of liberal, tolerant, internationally-minded patriotism; the other, of overbearing, aggressive chauvinism, or provincially limited nationalism. Western influence was predominant in the first trend; German and, to some extent, Russian in the second.

The Eastern European liberals, like the other political groups, were divided between these two trends. As a striking example, one can cite the ideological and political differences between two Czechoslovakian liberals: Thomas G. Masaryk and Karel Kramář. Masaryk, who of all the Eastern Europeans was the most deeply imbued with Western

liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland. 186 ●

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 648
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Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent.

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

648 genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was
● 186 an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated
665 the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

186 Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of
665 nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

alism was strong even in these parties. It must be remembered that even the ardor of Polish Catholicism had its roots in Polish nationalism: Catholicism was a defense against the Eastern Orthodox Russians as well as against the Protestant Prussians. 186 • 665

The Polish National Democratic Party, which represented the middle class and the intelligentsia, became chauvinistic and violently antisemitic in spite of its original liberal aspirations. It fought against Pilsudski's dictatorship more for reasons of power politics than for ideological reasons. From 1930 on, this party inclined, and especially its younger members, more and more towards fascism. Nationalism suppressed the liberal elements of this party almost entirely.

In Poland, where nationalism was more extreme than in the other Eastern European countries, liberalism was limited mostly to certain intellectual groups. One important group had its headquarters at the University of Cracow, with Professor Estreicher as its leader. Liberalism influenced the agrarians and socialists of Poland inasmuch as these groups much preferred democracy to dictatorship.

The case of Poland brings to mind very forcibly a factor which as a rule is not given its due: that is, the dependence of the nations of Eastern Europe upon the other nations of Europe and the rest of the world. The freedom of these nations is dependent on the freedom of all other European nations, including Russia.

It can be said, therefore, that liberalism can prosper in these countries only if the climate of Europe is favorable. As soon as a regime of any of the big powers on the European continent tends towards aggressive expansionism or becomes totalitarian, by definition imperialistic, the liberty of all European nations, great and small, is threatened, and liberalism finds itself in mortal danger.

History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In 000

weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668
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The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186
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186 had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the
668 foreign forces of fascism and Communism.
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829 Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czecho-
178 slovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal,
reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted
certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces
were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine
patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the
so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly every-
body followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk.
Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism
in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European coun-
tries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in
agriculture, because her social structure was happily bal-
anced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or
intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people
was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in
social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-
sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic
regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl,
Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually
far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had
liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and
Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The
Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great pa-
triot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In
Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater
difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, re-
sembled the other Eastern European countries more than
it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transforma-
tion of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of
Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European coun-
tries could have developed in a similar way had democracy
been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

54 CHALLENGE IN EASTERN EUROPE

000 might have been, aggravated the popular suspicion that democracy and representative institutions were inadequate to deal with the elementary problem of economic security, if, indeed, these institutions did not themselves bring on this problem.

The talking point most used by the Communist and other total dictatorships today is the wholly unjustified assertion that representative democracy cannot cope with the problem of guaranteeing elementary economic security, and that, if this problem is to be solved, mankind must suffer the harsh tyranny and arbitrary discretion of dictatorship. Until we succeed in extirpating from the minds of men the association of dictatorship and security, born largely of the depression and the aftermath of war and appealing especially to countries with little technological development, the future of representative institutions will be none too bright.

What has just been said does not apply directly to the earlier authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe since these, as already pointed out, came into being for the most part in the 1920's and hence antedated the depression. Nevertheless, this economic debacle aggravated the trend toward authoritarianism in these parts. In the cases of the second Bulgarian *coup d'état* in 1934 and King Carol's assumption of power in Rumania in 1938, economic influences can be discerned. The decline in trade and employment in the early '30's bore a distinct relationship to the weakening of the democratic regime in Bulgaria, and the incoming authoritarian regime adopted statist methods to meet these problems. Moreover, the depression weakened the resistance of the region as a whole to Nazi economic penetration, and the influence of the Western democracies declined as the world markets for the exports of Eastern Europe disappeared.

642 Another factor that paralyzed the democratic will and
 186 advanced the cause of reaction, especially in Eastern Europe,

was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy. [208]

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

ern Europe. The individual states became more and more antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first post-war years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength. 426 439

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperialism" were features characteristic of this area in the period between the wars. When the economic position of the new states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations. 186 433 648

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have 439

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Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with nationalism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the student organizations supported some political person or party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

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9 International Relations Between the Wars

HENRY L. ROBERTS

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000 The most striking aspect of the constellation of states in Eastern Europe after 1918 was that it should have come into existence at all. It is not that these states were "artificial" creations. It is rather that the appearance at that time of a zone of independent nation-states, from the Baltic to the Aegean, was largely the consequence of the simultaneous collapse, through war and revolution, of both Germany and Russia, an eventuality not anticipated in 1914. One cannot say what would have been the picture in Eastern Europe had either Germany or Russia emerged victorious, but certainly it would have been very unlike that which actually came about.

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● 186 The continued independence of the area was dependent upon preventing either of the two great powers from gaining ascendancy or from working with the other to control the non-Germanic and non-Russian peoples of the area, as they had done during much of the nineteenth century. This was a common burden of all the states of Eastern Europe after 1918. Unfortunately, it was almost their only real point of unity. The other unifying factor was that they were pre-

- 648 dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated
 • 186 between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

- 186 Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these
 563 differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It
 648 is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality.

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action.

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity

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fell directly or indirectly under German domination. There was, nevertheless, some continuity. Among the governments-in-exile, the struggle for future independence was clear and explicit. Likewise, among the German satellites, there was a persistent attempt to maintain a degree of independence. The extent of the resistance of Hungary to Hitler has come out quite clearly since the war in the memoirs of the statesmen involved. Even such an active and cooperative Eastern European satellite leader as Marshal Antonescu seems finally to have placed his hopes on a German defeat from the West, while he continued in the effort to keep Russia at bay in the East. 648
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It should also be noted, however, that the old frictions did not disappear. One major motive for Antonescu's entering the war, apart from the desire to recover Bessarabia, was his wish to put himself in a favorable position vis-à-vis Germany to press for the return of Northern Transylvania, which had been lost to Hungary in 1940. This old conflict continued unabated throughout the war. 648
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It is worth noting, finally, the importance to Eastern Europe of the fact that Russia did not emerge victorious in the First World War. We do not know what such a Russian regime would have been like or how it would have treated Eastern Europe, but we do have some clues from the secret treaties and arrangements made by the Entente powers during the war. Poland, including the German and Austrian sections, would probably have been incorporated into Russia. By an agreement in 1915 Russia was to obtain Constantinople and the Turkish territory in Europe. In a Russian-French exchange of notes in February 1917, Russia was given complete freedom to determine its own western frontiers. Thus the intrusion of Russia far into Eastern Europe was a likelihood in 1914-18, and was staved off in 1919-21 only to reappear as a reality in 1945 under new and decidedly more dangerous circumstances. In this sense there had been 000

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decided difference in emphasis. It is significant that in August 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the Soviet government summoned an All-Slav Congress to Moscow. The emphasis of this meeting was on industrialization, cultural autonomy, and respect for the national culture and language of each Slav people. The message sent by the Congress to the Slav peoples was typical of its sentiments:

Oppressed brother Slavs! A grave danger threatens us. The hour has struck for the entire Slavic world to unite and destroy fascism utterly and without loss of time.

We have come together as equals among equals. Our one, burning desire is that the Slavic nations, together with all other nations, should live their lives freely and in peace within the boundaries of their countries.

In a speech later that year, on November 6, Generalissimo Stalin amplified these sentiments by declaring:

Our aim is to aid the peoples in their liberation struggle against the Hitler tyranny and then to provide them with the opportunity freely to build their life in accordance with their desire. There must be no interference with the domestic affairs of other nations.

To this Slavic appeal was added an admiration for the Soviet war effort. Many Slavs saw the Russian sufferings as mirroring their own on a gigantic scale, so that the ordinary peasant, to whom a military account of a Red Army victory would mean nothing, carried in his mind a vivid image of the scorched earth, the devastation which Russia suffered, and the hardships and ferocity of his Slav brother's struggle. With the memory of their own unaided fight deeply rooted in their minds, the Slavs watched Russia bearing the brunt of the land war in a way they could understand because the conditions were familiar to them. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Communist Party's growing prestige as the war progressed provided the Soviet Union with a great measure of reflected glory as a communist state. Many Yugoslavs transferred their admiration for the Communist Party's role in their own

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- 186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the “Slavophile” doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski’s prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

- 648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito’s defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, ⁶⁴⁸ the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not ^[208] changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described ⁶⁴⁸ by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which ex- ¹⁸⁶ presses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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648 have all contributed to the making of Titoism. Specifically,
 ● 186 Titoism can be defined as a form of nationalism which conceives of Yugoslavia as an end in itself, and the rulers of that country are concerned only with the exclusive pursuit of national policies. It is thus not unique in political history nor does it contribute anything new to the diplomatic techniques available to the Western democracies. Titoism, is then but a matter of lack of loyalty to a higher power center outside the national state itself.

648 Tito and his colleagues in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exhibited the utmost faith and loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union throughout the war and in the immediate postwar years. Certainly in this period Tito was a marked Stalinist "internationalist." That is, one "who is ready to serve the Soviet Union unreservedly, unhesitatingly, unconditionally. . . ." The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the sole Communist Party to engage in partisan warfare in the days immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany. Up to 1948 the Yugoslav government was completely servile to the Soviet programs in the world diplomatic forums.

The Soviet Union had undoubtedly cast another role for Tito than that of a mere extra on the diplomatic stage. In May of 1946, Tito arrived in Moscow for a number of discussions regarding armament. How important this meeting was is best indicated by the rank of the individuals he took with him. Not only was he accompanied by Alexander Rankovich, who as Minister of Interior is also head of the secret police, but also the chiefs of staff of all the armed services. While it is not known what Tito promised in return for Soviet arms, one is able to speculate from the series of events which began the following month.

In July, Yugoslavia and Albania signed a military alliance, and in August two American planes were shot down in the vicinity of the Austrian-Yugoslavian border. Aid to the Greek Communists began in September; in the following month

178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

- 186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

Hungarian monarchy, an obvious reaction of the population to prolonged social and political disappointment was an increasing demand for national freedom. The sovereign nation-state would give the Czechs a fuller opportunity for careers for their young people and a more worthy share in determining their own destiny. A nation-state centered on Hungary would give Hungarian industries the protection they wanted and would free Hungarians from the delays and frustrations of the imperial relationship to Austria. The national state uniting Slovenes and Croats with Serbia would help these peoples at long last to make real headway in escaping from their backwardness. During these same years, the peoples in the small national states of the region dreamed of escaping from the compromises and frustrations of their own small-scale political existence by national expansion into some greater and victorious power in their own area. Serbians and Montenegrins came to hope that their lives would somehow improve once Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia had been joined to their own territories in a new Yugoslavia. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians all came to believe that somehow their own lives would improve significantly if all or most of the territory of Macedonia were added to their respective countries. 186 ● 631

Throughout large parts of Eastern Europe, the burdens and demands put upon the existing governments thus exceeded the capabilities of those governments and of the states they represented. The Eastern European states, large and small, were thus becoming overcommitted politically, economically, militarily, and socially. Among their peoples this situation encouraged the belief that things would become better once the size of political units in their region was changed. Citizens of small national states such as Serbia hoped for improvement from expansion. Citizens of large states, such as some of the Hungarians or Czechs in Austria-Hungary, began to wonder whether their position could not 186 178

- 186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
- 178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

- 178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
- 433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a number of successor states arose from its remains. There is no
- 641 doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
- 178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
- [735] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
- 464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178
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Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croats or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 ● 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563